EIP-1559 is the Ethereum standard that decides how a transaction’s base fee works: the protocol recalculates it every block from how full the last block was, then burns it, while a sender adds an optional tip on top. Here is how that calculation actually plays out, block by block.
The proposal was created on April 13, 2019 and carries Final status; it took effect on Ethereum’s mainnet on August 5, 2021, in the London network upgrade, at block 12,965,000. An earlier OSBBD guide covers where a transaction fee ends up once it is paid. This one covers how the base fee it describes is actually calculated.
The problem with the old fee market
Before EIP-1559, every sender set a gas price and miners picked the highest bids first. The EIP itself lists what that produced: fee levels that swing far out of proportion to the actual cost of processing a transaction, needless waits caused by the fixed per-block gas limit, and a bidding process complicated enough that senders routinely overpaid just to be safe. The proposal also flags a longer-term problem: once block subsidies taper off, a pure-auction fee market gives miners little reason to behave predictably.
How the base fee is set and adjusted
The base fee is not something a sender chooses. The protocol recalculates it every block from how full the previous block was, relative to a target.
- The gas target for a block is its gas limit divided by the elasticity multiplier, which EIP-1559 sets at 2. A block can still use up to twice the target in a single block if demand spikes.
- If the parent block used exactly the target amount of gas, the base fee carries over unchanged.
- If the parent block used more than the target, the base fee rises. The increase is capped at one-eighth, or 12.5%, of the parent base fee, scaled by how far over target the block was; a block at the maximum size raises the base fee the full 12.5%.
- If the parent block used less than the target, the base fee falls by the same proportional rule, with no floor other than a minimum of 1 wei.
- The fork block itself set the starting base fee to 1 gwei (1,000,000,000 wei).
Because the maximum move is fixed at one-eighth per block, the base fee cannot jump or crash in a single step. Sustained demand pushes it up block after block instead.
Why the base fee is burned
EIP-1559 does not pay the base fee to whoever produces the block. The EIP states that it “is always burned,” meaning the protocol destroys that ETH rather than transferring it. The proposal gives several reasons: it stops a block producer from manufacturing their own fee revenue by manipulating the base fee, it removes one source of the value-extraction games that motivated some front-running behavior, and it offsets part of the new ETH issued as block rewards.
Ethereum completed its separate move from proof of work to proof of stake on September 15, 2022. EIP-1559’s design does not depend on that change, but the party that used to be called a “miner” in the original 2019 text is now the validator that proposes the block; the base fee is still burned either way, and only the tip goes to whoever proposes the block.
Priority fee, max fee and max priority fee
A sender does not pay only the base fee. Three numbers work together on an EIP-1559 transaction:
| Term | What it means |
|---|---|
max_fee_per_gas | The most the sender will pay per unit of gas, covering base fee and tip together |
max_priority_fee_per_gas | The most the sender will give the block producer as a tip |
| Effective tip paid | The lesser of max_priority_fee_per_gas and (max_fee_per_gas minus the current base fee) |
The sender’s actual price per gas is the base fee plus that effective tip. A transaction is only valid if its max fee covers at least the current base fee and at least the tip it offers. The EVM opcode GASPRICE was changed to return this effective price rather than the sender’s raw bid, so a contract reading gas price mid-transaction sees what was actually paid, not a number the block producer could inflate by withholding a transaction.
Does EIP-1559 guarantee lower fees?
No, and the EIP does not claim to. The mechanism is built to track demand, not suppress it: a consistently full network still pushes the base fee up block after block, 12.5% at a time, until demand eases. What changes is predictability. A sender quoting max_fee_per_gas from the current base fee has a much better sense of what a transaction will actually cost than under the old first-price auction, where the only way to improve certainty was to overbid.





